Books | Lessons from Sri Lanka

Why the IPKF mission went horribly wrong. An extract

David Brewster, an Indian Ocean maritime security expert at the Australian National University, is among the few researchers who has tracked what he calls “India’s coercive strategies”. He has written extensively about India’s strategy towards Sri Lanka and the emergence of an “Indira Doctrine on the lines of the Monroe Doctrine.” Rajiv Gandhi adopted the less-risky option of attempting a ‘peacekeeping intervention’ rather than a muscular unilateral military intervention. He cannot be faulted for his strategic intent. Where he faltered was in his timing, and the inability to assess whether India had the operational capability to gain a favourable strategic outcome. Also, the prime minister was not cautioned by his foreign secretary, army chief or the high commissioner about the possibility of a peacekeeping operation turning into a bloody and prolonged counterinsurgency and counterterrorism campaign.

Operational Glitches

The initial euphoria with which the IPKF was received in Sri Lanka soon faded away because of the reluctance of the LTTE to lay down arms and the hesitation of the Sri Lankan forces to comply with the terms of the ISLA. The altered military objectives of the IPKF from peacekeeping to peace enforcement did not go down very well with the LTTE. Moreover, the IPKF did not have the capability to either coerce or compel its principal adversary to do its bidding. There was poor operational synergy and the successes, if any, can be attributed to individual acts of initiative and courage. General Sundarji failed to involve his fellow chiefs in any of the strategic discussions with Rajiv Gandhi, and there was no attempt to set up a joint task force. Consequently, the army units were controlled from Pune and Chennai, the air force from Trivandrum and the navy from Cochin. Synergy improved when General V.N. Sharma took over as army chief, but it was too late by then. Some pin the failure of Operation Pawan on the inability to make the transition from peacekeeping to peace enforcement and counterterrorism in varied terrain. Sundarji was a brilliant mind, but he did not anticipate the vicious turn of events and the ‘dirty fighting’. Harkirat was completely out of his depth and not in sync with the reality of the unfolding conflict landscape. Major General Ashoke Mehta says that while the “LTTE varied its strategy from ‘confrontation’ to ‘avoidance of contact’, ‘hit and run’ remained the mainstay of its tactics. The IPKF on the other hand could not shed its psyche of a conventional force, though it effectively engaged in small-scale counterinsurgency operations.” He adds, “It was unable to engineer a change in mindset: fight a guerrilla like a guerrilla.”

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Naval and Air Aspects

The Indian Navy conducted a variety of operations during the almost three-year deploymen