Lessons from Balakot

Shahid Raza

The elephant in the room for the Pakistan Air Force (PAF) is that its adversary, the Indian Air Force (IAF) is larger, better equipped and competent. Keeping this realisation in mind, the PAF, a tactical air force, over the years has had to adapt to the reality of always being outnumbered and outgunned.

The PAF was forged in the inferno of the Indo-Pakistani wars of 1965 and 1971. Its organisational growth continued during the Soviet-Afghan war when the PAF was engaged in combat against the Soviet Air Force and its Communist Afghan allies. The PAF also learned valuable lessons on indigenisation during the so-called ‘lost decade’ of the Nineties during which the PAF was unable to equip itself adequately due to the US sanctions.

When the Indo-Pakistani conflict broke out in the remote mountainous regions of Kargil, the PAF found itself poorly equipped to handle the crisis, especially due to the lack of a Beyond Visual Range (BVR) capability on its F-16 fighters. The ‘BVR Gap’ between the PAF and IAF tilted airpower dynamics in favour of the IAF throughout the Kargil crisis, therefore its focus remained primarily on maintaining homeland defences. The seriousness of the situation for PAF during that time cannot be better exemplified than the fact that the IAF lost two aircraft during the Kargil conflict, none of which were shot down by PAF.

This situation for the PAF changed after the 9/11 attacks in 2001, as the Americans suddenly found themselves in the need for Pakistani assistance in Afghanistan, and consequently, the sanctions imposed on the PAF were lifted. This opened a gateway for new development and acquisition programmes initiated by the PAF leadership at that time, to conduct fast-paced modernisation of the entire PAF. This is the time when the PAF launched its JF-17 Thunder fighter development initiative with China, placed an order for the F-16 C/D Block-52+ fighters, sought delivery of its remaining F-16 fighters which were placed under long-term storage in the US and put forth a requirement for the Mid Life Upgrade (MLU-MIII) for its F-16 A/B Block-15 aircraft.

During the past two decades, despite economic challenges, the PAF maintained a steady pace of modernisation - it not only acquired new aircraft but also inducted new capabilities by purchasing high-end assets such as the SAAB 2000 EriEye AEW&C from Sweden, ZDK-03 Karakoram Eagle AWACS from China, SPADA-2000+ surface-to-air missile system from MBDA, AN/TPS-77 Long Range Surveillance Radar system from Lockheed Martin, FALCO UAVs from Italy, IL-78 aerial refuelling tankers from Ukraine, and more recently, JY-27A VHF Radar system from China. During this period, the PAF also attained Nuclear Strike Capabilities to complete the aerial delivery element of the ‘Minimum Credible Deterrence’ strategy.

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Since the US-led invasion of Afghanistan, the PAF provided Close Air Support to the Pakistan Army then engaged in low-intensity conflict against various al Qaida linked militant organisations operating out of the unstable bordering regions of Pakistan and Afghanistan, and regular patrolling of the Indo-Pakistani border, mostly to deter potential intruders and UAVs. This all suddenly changed on 26 February 2019 when the IAF carried out a ‘Dead Drop’ strike in Pakistan’s Balakot region — across the International Border. This led to a reciprocal action by the PAF, which carried out a similar ‘Dead Drop’ operation across the Line of Control (LC) in the Jammu region, on the morning of 27 February 2019.

During the ensuing engagement, an IAF MiG-21 Bison interceptor was shot down by an AIM-120C AMRAAM fired by a PAF F-16 MLU aircraft. The Bison pilot, Wing Commander Abhinandan was captured by Pakistan and promptly released to minimise political escalation. Other than the downing of the MiG-21, a Mi-17V5 helicopter of the IAF became the victim of a fratricide, killing six IAF officers and crew onboard. There were various claims made by both sides after this aerial engagement including the downing of a Pakistani F-16 and an Indian Su-30MKI aircraft — although no convincing evidence was made available by both bellig