In the Fog of War

How CRPF with some support from the army resisted Pak attack in the Rann of Kutch. An extract

The withdrawal of INS Vikrant and all other naval ships from the waters off Kathiawar on 30 March allowed Pakistan to regroup. The possibility of an Indian amphibious thrust combined with the dropping of a para brigade into Sindh aimed at capturing Badin would certainly have occurred to both Musa and Ayub. From a purely theoretical point of view, it was a lost opportunity for the Indians. Unfortunately, despite India’s unique geographical positioning, with the subcontinent jutting out into the Indian Ocean and a coastline that extends from Kathiawar to the Sundarbans, India has never quite developed a maritime bent of mind. The naval chief was Admiral Bhaskar Sadashiv Soman and ever since 1962 (Sea Hawks and Alizes had been moved to Gorakhpur but air power in an offensive role was unfortunately not contemplated) the navy had been eager to see action. Chaudhuri, who had been the Southern Army commander, was known for his war room brilliance and a naval attack may not have been as far-fetched as it seems at first glance. If the recapture of Kanjarkot had indeed been the clear-cut objective, an amphibious landing would have placed the Indians behind Tikka Khan’s 8 Division, going for his home base while he was deployed facing 31 Brigade Group in the Rann.

Ayub and the Pakistan military leadership were extremely concerned at first and then relieved. On the ground around Kanjarkot, the Indians were not showing any signs of belligerence and the Pakistanis sitting on the dunes were getting impatient. Egged on by an aggressive Bhutto and the army, which was keen to test out its new equipment and tactics, and even though it would mean crossing the border into Indian territory, Ayub made up his mind.

By late afternoon on 6 April