In the Dead of the Night

How R&AW planned and executed the devastating attack on East Pakistan’s ports. An extract

At the time, Kao and Indira Gandhi were walking a perilous tightrope. Covertly, they were doing everything they could to extend support to the Muktijuddho. But officially, their hands were tied. Any overt gesture of support for East Pakistan would be seen as an act of aggression in the eyes of the world, and Pakistan would never stop playing the victim if that happened. Moreover, the US and China were waiting for a reason to lash out at India.

Kao and Gandhi had discussed this for hours before coming to a single conclusion: Pakistan had to be forced into making the first move. And they had to make that happen as fast as they could. Kao decided to step up the pressure through the attacks by the Mukti Bahini.

It was during this time that the names ‘Mukti Bahini’ and ‘R&AW’ began to be used interchangeably by the Indian armed forces.

The guerrilla force was supplied with mortars to up the scale of the destruction. Smooth bore guns for firing shells or bombs were included in the next supply of artillery to the Gano Bahini. While the Niyomito Bahini took care of the frontal attacks, the Gano Bahini operated the mortars and did the auxiliary damage.

Simultaneously, specialised training was imparted to the naval commando unit of the Mukti Bahini. Naval commandos who had defected to join the Muktijuddho, about 160 of them, were pulled off their current missions. They were given a new task—sinking ships.

West Pakistan had two routes to reach East Pakistan: airways and the Indian Ocean. India had successfully prohibited their air travel through Indian airspace, and now the plan was to cripple their access to the water as well. This mission was named Operation Jackpot. Commodore Abdul Wahed Chowdhary, one of the defecting Bengali submariners, led the team as the chief of Operation Jackpot. He was able to use the expertise he had gained as a submariner on PNS Ghazi in 1964. After the 1971 war, he would serve in important positions of the Bangladesh Navy, as the director of naval intelligence and as a member of the National Committee.

Additionally, the best swimmers from the Mukti Bahini camps were handpicked by the Indian Navy. They underwent specialised training for up to eighteen hours a day—a rigorous module that included swimming, night swimming, underwater swimming, underwater demolition, night demolition, object demolition training, the use of limpet mines, survival training, and hand-to-hand combat, among other things. Limpet mines, especially, required advanced training. These magnetic naval mines that are used to damage ships below the waterline are hard to handle, and swimmers have to carry them on their chest.

Slowly, Kao bult a navy for the Mukti Bahini. By the time the monsoon had arrived in India and East Pakistan, the commandos were ready.

The monsoon season, extending from June to September, favoured guerrilla tactics. Two-thirds of East Pakistan was waterlogged during these months, limiting mobility on roads, railways, and river crafts. The India-East Pakistan border was around 2,000-kilometers long and devoid of natural obstacles. Several roads and railway lines were close to the border and vulnerable to atta