Leadership Lessons

Lt Gen. V.K. Ahluwalia

How combining experience with out of the box ideas yield favourable results. An extract

In February 2011, it was decided that the army would conduct jungle warfare training in the Kondagaon area, one of the hot spots of Maoists violence. But hold your horses! This training was strictly for jungle warfare skills, not for taking on the Maoists. But before that, I had represented that the troops would require a minimum of two to three months for orientation training. After some discussions, it was finally accepted. Meanwhile, a lot of discussions, appeared in the media about the army’s deployment into the Maoists’ stronghold.

We established an operations centre in the Command HQ, where all incidents concerning the Naxalites were documented on a large scale map, to keep ourselves fully abreast with the situation. At a single glance, it was feasible to determine with a reasonable degree of accuracy their operations, focal points, and potential violence zones. These were meticulously analysed. During an address to the senior police officers at the IPS Academy in Hyderabad in 2011, I shared my evaluation of certain highly active areas in Jharkhand and Chattisgarh. Despite being challenged by one of the senior officers present, it was evident that my foresight was accurate as two significant incidents unfolded in the same region shortly after my statement. It is always good to have a view of the total incidents, their concentration, and analysis.

To ensure no misunderstandings, I decided to pro-actively gather the media for a briefing at Raipur about three months before the induction of troops. Although I wasn’t the most media-savvy guy, I knew I had to set the record straight, to be direct and transparent in communicating a message to the rebels and the public at large.

Also, our intention was not to participate in anti-Maoist operations, as the military, apart from its full-time dedication to safeguarding the borders, was already extensively engaged in Jammu & Kashmir, and the north-eastern region.

With a mix of nerves and excitement, I spelt out the army’s intensions clearly. The journalists, always hungry for juicy details, bombarded me with several questions. They asked me about the purpose, strength, and duration of the training. One particularly sharp journalist raised a valid point about the legality of deploying the army in a non-‘disturbed’ area. What if things got messy with the prevailing Maoist violence? He further amplified that without a formal declaration of a specific area as ‘disturbed’ the army could be embroiled in legal disputes due to the lack of necessary legal immunity.

It was a pragmatic inquiry that could present a considerable challenge during the induction process. Channelling my inner diplomat, I deliberated before responding, aiming to provide a well considered reply. I reaffirmed my previous assertion that the army’s brigade was undergoing induction solely for jungle warfare operational training, not for any engagements against the Maoists. There was no justification for the Mao