Leadership Lessons
Lt Gen. V.K. Ahluwalia
How combining experience with out of the box ideas yield favourable results. An extract
In February 2011, it was decided that the army would conduct jungle warfare training in the Kondagaon area, one of the hot spots of Maoists violence. But hold your horses! This training was strictly for jungle warfare skills, not for taking on the Maoists. But before that, I had represented that the troops would require a minimum of two to three months for orientation training. After some discussions, it was finally accepted. Meanwhile, a lot of discussions, appeared in the media about the army’s deployment into the Maoists’ stronghold.
We established an operations
centre in the Command HQ, where all incidents concerning the Naxalites were
documented on a large scale map, to keep ourselves fully abreast with the
situation. At a single glance, it was feasible to determine with a reasonable
degree of accuracy their operations, focal points, and potential violence
zones. These were meticulously analysed. During an address to the senior police
officers at the IPS Academy in Hyderabad in 2011, I shared my evaluation of
certain highly active areas in Jharkhand and Chattisgarh. Despite being
challenged by one of the senior officers present, it was evident that my
foresight was accurate as two significant incidents unfolded in the same region
shortly after my statement. It is always good to have a view of the total
incidents, their concentration, and analysis.
To ensure no misunderstandings,
I decided to pro-actively gather the media for a briefing at Raipur about three
months before the induction of troops. Although I wasn’t the most media-savvy
guy, I knew I had to set the record straight, to be direct and transparent in
communicating a message to the rebels and the public at large.
Also, our intention was not to
participate in anti-Maoist operations, as the military, apart from its
full-time dedication to safeguarding the borders, was already extensively
engaged in Jammu & Kashmir, and the north-eastern region.
With a mix of nerves and
excitement, I spelt out the army’s intensions clearly. The journalists, always
hungry for juicy details, bombarded me with several questions. They asked me
about the purpose, strength, and duration of the training. One particularly
sharp journalist raised a valid point about the legality of deploying the army
in a non-‘disturbed’ area. What if things got messy with the prevailing Maoist
violence? He further amplified that without a formal declaration of a specific
area as ‘disturbed’ the army could be embroiled in legal disputes due to the
lack of necessary legal immunity.
It was a pragmatic inquiry that could present a considerable challenge during the induction process. Channelling my inner diplomat, I deliberated before responding, aiming to provide a well considered reply. I reaffirmed my previous assertion that the army’s brigade was undergoing induction solely for jungle warfare operational training, not for any engagements against the Maoists. There was no justification for the Mao
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