The Right Move

S.K. Sood

An Indian Express report on August 22 indicates that the Rashtriya Rifles (RR) is being withdrawn from cities and villages in Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) to strengthen the anti-infiltration grid. These RR units will be withdrawn in a phased manner and the space vacated by them will be filled by deploying Central Armed Forces (CAF).

The latest move is consistent with the rising fears amongst the military leadership as well as policy makers that the commitment of the Indian Army in tackling the internal security in J&K is compromising security along the Line of Control (LC) and therefore, creating gaps which are exploited by infiltrators.

Deployment of the army in anti-insurgency operations is also impacting the war fighting capabilities of the army. The large-scale involvement in anti-militancy role has an adverse impact by depriving the army units from the much-needed turnover to peace stations for training, rest and regrouping. Even the raising of RR, the counter-insurgency force raised in the Nineties to deal with internal security in the J&K region had strained the human resources of the army as it had drawn manpower from all arms and services of the army. That there is shortage of manpower for national defence is established from the fact that many RR units had to be withdrawn from Jammu area for deployment on the Line of Actual Control (LAC) with China after the situation along the border with China became tense.

There are several other related factors which have an adverse impact on the war preparedness of the army. The first of these is the large shortage of troops because of very limited recruitment in the army during the last few years. The introduction of Agniveers has created an atmosphere of two-way uncertainty—among the troops because of insecure career prospects and among the commanders, because of the apprehensions about motivation and abilities of these Agniveers.

Lack of training of RR units in war fighting is another factor which may impact their performance on the LAC. The RR units trained mainly in small team operations against militants may not be mentally and physically equipped to undertake regular offensive and defensive operations against the regular army of the adversary nation. Further, these RR units diverted to the LC are not cohesive regimented units unlike the regular army.

It is therefore important to relieve the army from the responsibility of internal security in J&K and replace them with CAF. These forces have lot of experience of fighting insurgents and militants in different parts of the country including in J&K. The policy planners must therefore seriously think on the lines of replacing army with CAF.

Replacement of army from anti-insurgency grid in J&K will have to be planned meticulously to ensure that vacuum is not created. The detailed induction plan should ensure replacement of the army in a phased manner. The entire process of replacement of the army may take up to a couple of years because firstly, there may not be enough CAF troops readily available for induction in J&K. Secondly, there may be certain gaps in the manpower, training and equipment of the CAF which may need to be addressed before CAF are inducted. Measures will, therefore, have to be initiated to bridge these gaps before the CAF fully replace the army in J&K.

Initially, the CAF units presently deployed in J&K for rear area security and road opening tasks should be utilised to replace the army units. The gaps thus created in the rear area security can be filled by deploying the units of territorial army etc., till the time more units of CAF can be fetched up for deployment in entire Union Territory (UT) of J&K. These units of CAF should carry out joint operations to familiarise with the area and also with the intelligence assets.

A well-defined counter-insurgency grid with clearly designated area of responsibilities of each CAF which do not overlap needs to be created—a coordinating mechanism in shape of ‘Integrated Command Centre’ where all the forces are represented. This body should have the wherewithal to collate, analyse and disseminate the intelligence. This body should also have the authority to mobilise forces to other areas in case required.

The first and foremost issue that would need to be addressed is to augment the strength of CAF proposed to be deployed in J&K. The government has recently sanctioned additional battalions for Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF). These additional units of CRPF after raising and training should be deployed in J&K at the earliest. CRPF will also have to be divested of several other tasks like providing security to many VIPs to enable maximum availability of troops for J&K. However, CRPF being the internal security force of the country is often requisitioned to tackle law and order problems in many parts of the country. Hence, it may not be possible for the CRPF alone to control the situation. Other forces will also have to be inducted in J&K including border guarding forces (BGF).

The thinning out of BGF and diverting them from original task for deployment in J&K will compromise border security, thus imperilling national security. It may also lead to influx of illegal migrants and increase in trans-border crime. Therefore, more units of these forces along with supervisory headquarters will have to be raised for deployment in J&K. One can cite the example of Border Security Force (BSF) raising force levels equal to two frontiers and an exclusive theatre Command for dealing with Maoist insurgency in central India. Besides this, pre-existing large scale deficiencies of manpower in the BGF will also have to be filled up expeditiously.

The CAF have the requisite experience and ethos for fighting violent militancy as has been evidenced by their role in tackling militancy in Punjab, Northeast and in Central India. Even in J&K, the CAF were the ones which were at the forefront till early this century. However, the organisations and leadership model of the CAF would need to be investigated.

The operational leadership up to the level of commandant has always proved its ability both in internal security and on borders. To fight militancy in J&K, they will need to remain participative and lead the troops from the front. However, to be more effective, they will need to know their troops well. This is possible by ensuring high level of regimentation up to the unit command level. The permanency of troops and commanders in a CAF unit will have to be ensured. The government would need to have a fresh look at the policy implemented a couple of decades ago, wherein one third of troops from the units of CAF are rotated every year. This has led to adverse impact on understanding and bonhomie amongst the troops and is detrimental to having intimate knowledge about the capabilities and limitations of each other and of commanders. This is a crucial aspect of small team operations while operating in anti-militancy environment. This policy was implemented in all CAF except the BSF which was the only organisation where the operational leadership, having realised the likely adverse impact of breaking the regimentation, resisted the move. Restoration of earlier policy of retaining identity of units intact will go a long way in enhancing their effectiveness.

It will also be essential to orient the CAF for anti-insurgency role by focussing on training for various operations that are required to be carried out in J&K. Necessary modification of training modules at the force level training institutions will be required. The units being inducted in J&K will have to be put through pre induction training immediately before their deployment in J&K. The regional training institution located in J&K will have to be equipped to undertake this task.

The type of operations that are required to be carried out in J&K will necessitate junior leaders to be trained to take initiative and on the spot decisions because senior leaders will not be readily available to guide them. The troops and junior commanders will have to be sharpshooters because the militants don’t give a second chance. The forces will have to retain proper teeth to tail ratio to ensure adequate troops are available for operations. The recent cadre review of the Group B and C staff of the BSF, however, is detrimental to this as it, in fact, increases the tail vis-à-vis teeth in the smallest subunits and groups viz platoons and sections.

One major grouse of the people of J&K is about human rights violations by troops. The training modules should therefore specifically include familiarisation with the area, cultural practices of the locals besides knowledge of commonly used words. The troops must also be familiarised with important aspects of human rights. The battle is about winning the hearts and minds of people, and so the troops also must be trained in soft skills.

One important issue that the decision-makers must address is the feeling of resentment amongst the locals about presence of the army at each nook and corner of the populated areas. They resent the fact that they are subjected to frequent searches which interferes with their daily routine. The deployment of the forces will have to be less intrusive. It is recommended that instead of setting up bunkers at regular distance in close vicinity, the forces should focus on area domination through regular patrols from appropriately located Company Operation Bases (COBS) or headquarters from where Quick Reaction Teams (QRTs) can be launched at the earliest upon receipt of information. Focus must be on intelligence-based operations. Thus, preventing unnecessary interference in the daily life of locals and thus inculcating a feeling of confidence amongst them about the forces. Feeling of confidence will also help generate actionable intelligence. Such compact deployment will also ensure availability of adequate reserves for quick deployment in case of necessity. Such compact deployment will also enable troops of the CAF to train, rest and recuperate.

The CAF deployed must extend their area of domination gradually to the interiors and deep jungles to deny hiding places to the terrorists. This will also prevent supplies from reaching the militants. The CAF deployed in central India have done this effectively by slowly proceeding to establish well-fortified posts in hitherto unmapped jungles of Abujmarh. The training of troops should focus on seek and destroy missions and intelligence-based cordon and search operations. Close coordination with the army and BSF troops deployed along the LC is important to ensure that militants, if any, are intercepted and neutralised.

It is recommended that each of the force deployed in J&K must raise an intelligence set-up like the ‘G’ branch of the BSF. Those inducted in the intelligence set-up of each force must be trained to sift and analyse a plethora of information available and disseminate it at the earliest for action after proper collation and interpretation. The intelligence set-up of each force will have to closely coordinate with each other. An integrated body where all the security forces are represented along with the state and national intelligence agencies is recommended to be set-up to enable properly coordinated intelligence operations. Such a body will also go a long way in ensuring that the available information is disseminated in appropriate time-frame for action.

Operating in tough mountainous terrain will require the troops to be equipped with light equipment including with bullet-proof jackets and light small arms for close encounters. The troops deployed in the towns need not be equipped with area weapons to avoid collateral damage. However, these weapons will be handy for the troops deployed in the interiors and in mountains.

The government appears to have taken the first step towards induction of CAF in J&K as mentioned earlier. However, undue hurry must be avoided, and the CAF should be inducted only gradually so as not to leave any gaps in security in the Union Territory. A properly conceived and executed plan will ensure stability.

The need is to focus on transformational changes in the security set up in J&K and not be focussed merely on transactional ones.