Most Pakistanis believe that the roots of Pakistan’s nuclear programme go back to the trauma of the loss of its eastern part in 1971 and India’s first nuclear test in 1974. Pakistan’s desperate diplomatic efforts for protection against the nuclear threat from India got no response. Pakistan’s proposal for a nuclear weapons’ free zone in South Asia was also ignored. Thus, began Pakistan’s quest for a nuclear weapons capability that finally culminated in the response to India’s 1998 tests.

Whatever may have been India’s reasons for bringing the nuclear factor into the sub-continent, it is clear that the 1998 tests not only demonstrated an existing capability but also a potential on both sides to significantly enhance that capability. The progress in missile development is proof of this. Pakistan started its missile development programme seriously after India launched its Integrated Guided Missile Development Programme. Pakistan’s missile development acquired urgency after the US invoked the Pressler Amendment and halted the delivery of F-16 aircraft. Also, Pakistanis tend to consider the recent all-time low in the India-Pakistan relationship against the backdrop of some major past events:

These events are being flagged because they do not need an explanation to emphasise their implications. In spite of all this, the recent injection of political resolve by Prime Minister Vajpayee to settle issues through dialogue has evoked a positive response from both sides even though this is tempered with cynicism because of the past record. It may help if there can be a preview of possibilities for the people to consider, if ever there is a move towards a fundamentally new relationship between India and Pakistan.

Given the present state of the nuclear and missile capabilities, and the known nuclear and missile plans of India and Pakistan, the general perception is that the nuclear capability, including delivery systems, is not going to be rolled back and nor is its evolution going to be halted. From all indications both sides will continue to build up and operationalize strategic capabilities. This implies continuous and, perhaps, enhanced fissile material production, improved warhead designs, varied and more delivery systems and, of course, operational and training measures. There is also going to be a progression towards survivable assets and an assured second strike capability because this is the only way the ‘first use’ and the ‘no first use’ debate is going to be resolved. The tests in 1998 should have removed any lingering doubts that India may have had about Pakistan’s grasp of nuclear and missile technology. The implications of nuclear weapons in relation to the conflict in Kashmir must therefore be understood because there have been three wars in the past over this issue. There are thoughts on the possibility of a limited war as escalation of the situation in Kashmir and of sub-conventional war moving into a nuclear exchange without the tier of a conventional war. We have recently seen India’s use of its military power in a strategy of coercion even though the political and military objectives of the threatened war were never clear, and there are doubts that the coercion worked. India and Pakistan may now be slowly moving out of their ‘zero dialogue’ situation and there is definitely a realisation of the cost and dangers of continuing hostility and an arms race.