Guest Column | Road to Power

Lt Gen. Vinod Bhatia (retd)

To get rich, one must build roads
-An ancient Chinese Proverb

The 73-day Doklam standoff has been apparently resolved at the politico-diplomatic level. The peaceful resolution should be attributed to a firm and resolute stand by the Indian Army at the face-off site. The tactical level demonstration of strength was possible as the Indian Army deployment at Doka La dominates the Doklam Plateau fortunately duly supported by a functional road constructed by the Army Engineers through what is commonly known as an operational works. This sort of an infrastructural advantage along the 3,488 km India-China border and the Line of Actual control (LAC) is lacking in most areas.

It is also reported that the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has constructed a road joining Merug La (north of Doklam) to South Doklam extending to Jampheri Ridge about four to five kilometre east of Doka La or the earlier face-off site, creating certain strategic vulnerabilities for India. China has once again demonstrated that roads are the key to military domination along the Himalayan borders. It will be prudent to analyse the infrastructure along the border areas to deduce relevant lessons and chart out an implementable and pragmatic action plan to ensure continued peace and tranquillity along the LAC. On account of differing perceptions of the LAC, an assertive and aggressive China and a growing new India, the peace and tranquillity along the LAC will be constantly and continuously under stress, with increase in frequency, intensity and depth of transgressions, leading to more and more ‘stand-offs’. The Doklam is likely to be the new normal. The critical question is does India have relevant and future ready organisations and structures to meet the challenges and construct the requisite infrastructure especially along the LAC in an acceptable time-frame.

The 1962 war was undoubtedly a debacle for India. Wars always bring out certain lessons, both for the victor and the vanquished. Though the Henderson Brooks report stays buried in secrecy, one lesson that India learned was that the nation needs an effective and professional armed forces capable of defending its frontiers. China, on the other hand, having crossed the high Himalayas and reached the foothills in certain areas, unilaterally withdrew, having realised the enormity of the task of sustaining a force without an adequate road network. The PLA on 20 November 1962 was staring at a long and harsh winter, without the means to survive and sustain in the underdeveloped high altitude captured Indian territories. China learned its lesson well and has gainfully applied its energy and ample resources to create a world class, state-of-the-art, multi modal, multi-dimensional infrastructure in Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR). This includes a vast road and rail network, airfields, oil pipelines, logistic installations, habitat and warehousing. The infrastructure developed has also helped China integrate Tibet and settle its Han majority, thus changing the demographic pattern in this remote and generally hostile region.

India, on the other hand, shied away from constructing roads and building infrastructure along the Tibet border in a mistaken belief that lack of roads will degrade the China threat, and deter deep incursions in the event of another war. As a misplaced strategy, India did not construct any roads along the India-China Border. In 2010, defence minister A.K. Antony while addressing a function organised by the Border Roads Organisation (BRO) said, “Earlier the thinking was that inaccessibility in far-flung areas would be a deterrent to the enemy”. He acknowledged that this was an ‘incorrect approach’ and stated that the government has decided to upgrade roads, tunnels and airfields in the border areas. The China Study Group approved 73 roads to be constructed in 2005 and to be completed by 2012. As per July 2017 update to Lok Sabha, construction of 73 strategic roads was revised with deadlines extended to 2019-2020, this includes 43 by the ministry of defence (MoD) and 27 by the ministry of home affairs (MHA), of which only 21 roads by March 2017 and 30 roads by July 2017 have been completed and remaining are under construction as progress was retarded. BRO is constructing 63 out of these 73 roads. The delays are attributed to multiple reasons like wildlife conservation and environmental approval, insurgency related security hurdles, delay in land acquisition by the states, inaccessible terrain, inclement weather, poor planning, construction cap