Adm. Arun Prakash (retd)

Our racial memory has, with good reason, always been obsessed by the perpetual threat of invasion from the Himalayan passes; the Pakistani marauders who came across Uri in ’47 and the PLA hordes who swarmed down the slopes of Tawang in ’62 only served to reinforce this historical and cultural fixation.

When India gained Independence, those charged with planning for the country’s embryonic maritime force were fortuitously, men of vision; and within six months had prepared a 10-year expansion plan for the consideration of the Government of India. The plan was drawn up around the concept of two fleets; one for the Arabian Sea and the other for the Bay of Bengal, each to be built around a light-fleet carrier to be later replaced by larger fleet carriers. This somewhat grandiose plan, which received the approval of both, the Governor General Earl Mountbatten and the PM Pandit Jwaharlal Nehru unfortunately failed to materialise. Hostilities with Pakistan in the state of Jammu and Kashmir barely two months after Independence focused the young nation’s attention as well as scarce defence resources towards the Himalayas rather than the oceans, and the naval plans were put on the back burner.

Subsequently, during the first few decades post-Independence, the IN existed in an environment of uncertainty. There was a time when we needed to justify, year after year, our plans, our acquisitions and often our very raison d’etre to a sceptical government. It was only in the 1980s that the navy’s potential as an instrument of state power began to dawn on decision-makers and found a permanent niche in their consciousness.

1


As the smallest of the three armed forces of a nation beset with a continental mind-set, the IN has faced numerous challenges from time to time. This article attempts to provide a ringside view from the higher reaches of NHQ, circa 2003-06, as well as some personal views and observations relating to force planning issues and processes.

Remoulding Minds
Today, India’s emergence as an economic power of global significance and our essential reliance on the sea for energy, trade and projecting influence, is rapidly changing perceptions, and arousing the maritime consciousness of the intelligentsia. While India possesses all the attributes of a potential major power, an inherent cultural diffidence holds her back from assuming the mantle and responsibilities of a regional maritime power. The challenge thus clearly lies in our minds; and re-moulding of perception has been a consistent endeavour of the naval leadership.

Conventional deterrence and war-fighting are indeed the bread and butter of navies, but these remain essentially linked to threats, which inevitably tend to wax and wane cyclically with diplomatic activity. Such has been our naiveté and myopia in matters of national security that periodically there emerges a view amongst decision makers that with ‘peace breaking out’ all round, the possibility of conflict is diminishing and that defence spending needs to be cut back. On occasions in the past, just as this view was about to prevail, a security crisis has arisen to bring us back from the brink; and so regrettably, we have seen this farcical cycle enacted many times in our brief history.

Of all the armed forces, navies take the longest to build and consolidate; and a growing force like the IN cannot afford to remain hostage to fluctuating security perceptions. The challenge for us therefore lay in reducing emphasis on threat perceptions as the sole arbiter in the force planning process, and bringing opinion (within and out