Narain D. Batra

When China’s President Xi Jinping visited India on 17-19 September 2014, Modi, bypassing diplomatic protocols, received him at Ahmedabad in his home state, Gujarat, where they visited the Gandhi Ashram, promenaded on the Sabarmati riverfront and in the Gujarati tradition of welcoming guests, they sat side-by-side on a swing (jhoola). In Delhi, President Xi offered to invest $20 billion in India’s infrastructure for the next five years, part of a slate of 12 agreements that both sides signed during the visit. Curiously enough, when they were building rapport and bonding with each other in Ahmedabad, the Chinese troops were sneaking into Ladakh to build a road that led to a confrontation, and after a five-day standoff, the Chinese troops retreated form Ladakh. What China said was different from what China might do, it seemed.

China’s frequent transgressions into India across the 2,520-mile-long Himalayan border (411 incursions in 2013, for example) normally go unreported in the media; but when the Chinese troops tried road building in the Indian territory as happened in Ladakh during President’s Xi visit, it could not be ignored. According to a South Asian expert, this wasn’t ‘the first example of incursions preceding major bilateral meetings. Last year (2013), a significant mid-April incursion led to Chinese troops setting up camp in tents, also in the Ladakh area (Depsang). This extended over a two-week period into early May, and Indian media reported that the Chinese troops had extended nineteen kilometers into Indian territory. Premier Li Keqiang visited Delhi May 19 to 21 of last year (2013).’