Cheap and Dispensable

Mohammad Asif Khan

Asymmetry often plays a decisive role in conflicts, particularly when one side holds a significant power advantage over the other. Throughout modern history, technological progress has mainly favoured militarily superior nations, widening the gap between them and their adversaries. In response, less powerful nations seek asymmetrical tools to level the playing field. Low-cost drone warfare emerges as a critical means to bridge this capability gap, offering a strategy to offset the dominance of more powerful forces.

On 13 April 2024, Iran launched a retaliatory drone and missile strike named Operation True Promise in response to an alleged Israeli bombing of the Iranian embassy in Damascus on 1 April 2024. The attack reportedly included over 180 Shahed drones, more than 120 ballistic missiles like Kheibar Shekan and Emad, and over 30 Paveh cruise missiles.  While most of the drones were intercepted by the combined effort of Israel’s air defence system, United States’ (US) military, United Kingdom’s (UK) Royal Air Force and French fighters shot down some missiles. Even Jordan reportedly shot down some missiles that entered their airspace.

Iran’s drone assault on Israel highlighted the emerging paradigm of warfare, demonstrating that from Iran to Ukraine, the current era is characterised by the prevalence of cost-effective drone warfare. The attack did not cause any significant damage to Israeli infrastructure, but it highlighted the economic benefits of cheap drones for countries like Iran which is under heavy economic sanctions and the challenges it poses for Israel and US bases in the region.

The combined expenditures of the United States and Israel in countering the Shahed drones likely totalled approximately USD 1.5 billion. In contrast, the overall cost for Iran to deploy the Shahed drones was estimated to be around USD 3 million. This vast difference illustrates how adversaries can strain their military budgets by compelling them to constantly replenish and reinforce their air defences and air force at considerable expense.

Both Hamas’ Al-Qassam Brigades and Hezbollah have adopted the same strategy of using relatively inexpensive rockets and drones to impose a high cost on Israel’s sophisticated and expensive air defence systems. Hezbollah can deploy swarms of drones simultaneously against a single target to overwhelm Israel’s air defence systems. The group has an arsenal that includes unguided artillery rockets, as well as ballistic, anti-air, anti-tank, antiship missiles, mortars and drones. The bulk of Hezbollah’s arsenal consists of short-range and unguided projectiles, mostly ‘Katyusha’ variants.

Al-Qassam Brigades has used drones for surveillance and reconnaissance purposes but also to neutralise the Iron Wall’s CCTV cameras in simultaneous attacks. They have also relied on fixed-wing kamikaze Al-Zawari drones to contribute to the numerous rocket launches to the saturation of the Iron Dome system.

Iran’s Economics of Cheap Drones

This strategy is not only cost-effective for these groups, but it also poses a significant challenge for Israel’s air defence systems. Despite the advanced capabilities of systems like the Iron Dome, the sheer volume of incoming threats can be difficult to manage. This strategy effectively turns Israel’s technological superiority into a potential weakness, as each successful penetration of the air defence system by a cheap rocket or drone inflicts damage out of proportion to the cost of the weapon used.

Even if Israel shoots down most drones, some may get through, potentially causing damage and ac