Books | Outdated Lessons

Pravin Sawhney

Recalling the lesson he learnt in the staff college over thirty years ago, Air Chief Marshal B. S. Dhanoa, who retired on 30 September 2019, told his audience at the virtual session of the Military Literature Festival in Chandigarh in December 2020 that, ‘In the mountains, 3:1 ratio of PLA soldiers would be needed to dislodge Indian soldiers from heights.’ He was answering a question on why despite the advancement in technology, it was necessary to hold the heights on Siachen glacier, a site where India and Pakistan have been facing-off since 1984.

As chair for the session on the PLAAF in the wake of the Ladakh crisis Dhanoa said that a possible war with the PLA, while being intense, would be limited in time and space. What’s more, India will be able to hold its own against China. Since the crisis in Ladakh started in May 2020, Dhanoa was the first service chief (albeit retired) to make this claim.

The reason for Dhanoa’s assertion was the belief that in the mountains there can be no real victory, only a perception of victory. According to him, ‘China cannot take Leh and we cannot take Lhasa, hence each side could interpret a win for itself.’ In this interpretation of victory, holding of heights and the IAF would both play a critical role, he said.

‘We were taught at staff college that an obstacle had to be covered by fire and held by troops; otherwise, it does not remain an obstacle since the enemy could negotiate around it. To overcome the obstacle, the enemy needs to concentrate to attack it en masse. This is when you do heavy attrition on them, and the air force does this best,’ he told the audience.

According to him, the IAF will have to operate in conjunction with the ground forces and cause attrition which the PLA, given its risen geopolitical profile, will not be able to take. Thereafter, ‘It’s perception of victory.’ Taking a cue from him, a two-star retired air force officer on the panel expostulated that the Indian military was prepared for contingencies involving two limited fronts, and not extended fronts, against Pakistan and China.

But this thinking arising from a thirty-year-old education cannot hold good for all time to come. In military sciences, even one year ago is old. In addition, the scope of the war—whether it would be limited or full scale—will be determined by the military objectives of the stronger side. In this case, the PLA.

Curiously, most Indian military officers, both serving and retired, seem to be referring to the same playbook. In an interview with me in December 2020, the then COAS, General Naravane had said roughly the same thing. According to him, given the standard attack ratio of 3:1 with 10 per cent accepted casualties in the mountains, it would take the PLA up to 3,000 casualties to dislodge an Indian brigade (3,500 men) holding a height. Even with state-of-the-art-technology, the PLA will have to deploy boots on the ground to capture any ground.

Air-Land Battle

Naranave and Dhanoa are not the only military experts to think like this. The Indian military continues to follow the warfighting concept that the US propounded in the 1980s. Called Air-Land doctrine, it was unveiled in 1986. It laid emphasis on gaining initial success by the clarion call of ‘win the first battle’. Placing excessive importance on tactics, the Air-Land doctrine divided the enemy area into tactical—for fighting battles and engagement