A Cost Too High

Many lessons from the Kargil conflict of 1999 remain unlearned

In one sense, the Kargil operation was a plus. Not in terms of the victory, but because of the crucial lessons that come out of it. Army Headquarters and the defence ministry realised just how ill-prepared we were and just how vulnerable the lack of proper equipment left us. In terms of proper equipment, the lesson has clearly been learnt. Over the last three months, adequate high altitude equipment and clothing have started flowing in, making life a little easier for the officers and men who now have to guard a new stretch of inhospitable border.

But there were other lessons that were as, if not more, crucial, relating to the total lack of intelligence gathering. Some advanced intelligence gathering equipment like electronic sensors, radars and night vision devices have been ordered and will arrive, but the main problem we faced was with human intelligence. The various intelligence agencies responsible, from RAW to Military Intelligence, failed in their primary job: to alert the country to an intrusion by hundreds of enemy soldiers. It was an intelligence failure of Himalayan proportions and a number of brave men paid for the lapse with their lives.

This is clearly the most crucial lesson of the war: that we had fought a critical, difficult battle in an information void. There was little if any intelligence even halfway through the battle. 14 JAK Rifles were told they were up against ‘a handful of mercenaries.’ They counted 240 regular army soldiers walking back across the LoC at Kaksar one the withdrawal was announced. Such disinformation caused untold damage. If we did not know the numbers, and were always underestimating, this meant we were also constantly underestimating their weapon-holding capabilities. We officers all agree on the need to upgrade our electronic surveillance. In retrospect, now that the battle is officially over, we also realise the lack of a proper joint intelligence apparatus at the national level.

Officers at Northern Command tell me that there is hardly any coordination between the plethora of different agencies: Military Intelligence, Intelligence Bureau (IB) and RAW, all of which are active in Kashmir. While RAW had failed to give any information pertaining to the build-up at the border; IB had passed on information, which is now being pushed under the carpet. As early as June 2, its director, Shyamal Dutta, had penned his signature to a note, which went right up to the prime minister and our DGMO, regarding a build-up in the sector. It had also talked of increased helicopter activity at Skardu, but our officers in Delhi now say that IB has a habit of sending such notes all the time.

Moreover, there is so much distrust between the agencies. IB’s staff in Kashmir reports to its head office in Delhi. Seldom, as we officers in CI Ops will confirm, is this information shared at the local level. The distrust is evident in the meetings of the Unified Headquarters in Srinagar. There were, according to officers present, constant arguments and differences in perception. IB and RAW are already accusing 15 Corps of underplaying the number of militants and mercenaries who infiltrated the state. Finally, Corps decided to put on record the various intelligence inputs from all the agencies.

An exercise unearths the fact